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ASPECTS AND AIMS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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“Security sector reform will achieve little without a broader process of transformation of the society. But the reverse is also true. The political reform process will get stalled without a thorough transformation of the security sector. It is a process that goes beyond the civil control of the armed forces; it needs to be a process of democratic control.”¹

This essay is intended as an introduction to Security Sector Reform. It is aimed at providing a foundation and reference guide to CICP work in this area. It does not seek an exhaustive analysis of the topic, but rather a supportive literature review that can serve as a useful taxonomical tool for civil society and/or parliamentarians. Section I of the essay examines SSR in detail to elucidate the different understandings of its definition and dimensions, and indicate any potential overlap between them. Section II of the essay looks at SSR in relation to peacekeeping with a focus on DDR and transitional justice, local ownership, and the role of parliaments.

I. Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Considerations

A. Historical Development of SSR-

Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a concept and practice has followed from the redefinition of security threats and increased cooperation of the international community in the aftermath of the Cold War, from the recognition that failure to address the security sector is a key impediment to development, and from the proliferation of the ideal of human security in terms of people-centered national interests.² On the one hand, there is now general agreement that security and peace are public goods, and as with any collective goods, there are issues of relative degrees of scarcity. On the other hand, the amount and efficiency of resources needed for public order link to questions concerning the transparency and accountability of military budgets, along with democratic civilian management. Effective security sector reform is thus oriented toward both effective civil oversight and forming security institutions that effectively and efficiently provide for the public in each state.

¹ Herbert Wulf, *Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, July 2004, p. 16.

² David Chuter, “Understanding Security Sector Reform” in *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol.4, no.2, April 2006, pp. 3-5.

SSR is the offspring of a conjunction of multiple historical roots. First, it is based on the paradigm of civil-military relations (1970s) which centered on making the armed forces accountable to and supervised by civilian authorities. Second, it is rooted in the principle of democratic control (1980s) which focused on achieving accountability and transparency in the security sector. Third, it reflects the OSCE initiative of the ‘Code of Conduct’ whereby the democratic principle was extended to non-military components of security such as police, intelligence agencies, and paramilitary organizations. Fourth, the impact of the shift to focus on non-traditional security threats and human security linking the risks of social and economic factors to personal and communal well-being.³

SSR discussion has evolved out of the ideologically laden security policies of the Cold War and the failure of development policies which can be partly attributed to a lack of inclusion of the security sector as a key ingredient to economic progress. The role of the security sector and its links to development programs was consistently considered contentious and outside the mandate of development agencies. In this context, relations with the military of developing states were left to the military institutions of developed states. SSR due to the experience of persistent authoritarianism, including in some cases military coups and sustained military rule, discussions of the security sector turned to address the resources consumption and waste of resources, the importance of the military in the process of nation-building, and the importance of the military in modernization.⁴

Another approach to the history of SSR sees the military and development issues as imbricated from the outset. As such, SSR can be traced to the question of the proper role of the military in developing countries, bridging CMR and development concerns. Three interrelated questions arose: whether resources consumed by the military should be put to other purposes for better use; how the military could contribute to overall nation-building qua territorial and institutional integrity; and, how the armed forces affected modernization. Initially, the perspective on the armed forces was positive, but this shifted in the 1970s in the wake of widespread intervention of the military into politics, in Asia and even more so in Africa and Latin America.

³ Niagale Bagayoko-Penone “Promoting peace and democracy through security sector reform”, *Insights: Research Findings for Development and Policymakers*. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. No.70, November, 2009, p. 1.

⁴ Herbert Wulf, *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries*. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Eschborn, 2000.

Attention turned to the causes of coups and the ultimate effects of military rule. In the context of the Cold War military studies and development studies were disassociated, not surprisingly given the priority on the alliance of specific states irrespective of the form of the government regime.⁵

The transformation that follows the Cold War wherein military and development issues are again linked is rooted in several factors. First, development donors became increasingly concerned about the effect of military expenditures in draining potential resources for development. Second, the second wave of democratization correlated to the end of military rule in Latin America and the spread of democracy in Africa, allowed for increased examination of the importance of professionalization of the military and increasing the governance capacity of civilian institutions. Third, the concept of good governance was expanded to include measures of efficiency of resource expenditure. Fourth, both development and conflict resolution efforts agreed on the need for effective demobilization in post-conflict scenarios. Fifth, reconstruction following conflicts became increasingly aware of the importance of the rule of law and effective legal institutions including the police. Sixth, threats to personal physical security were recognized as obstacles to economic growth. Finally, the notion of security was expanded from traditional issues to include human and people-centered issues. As such, the conception of security has transformed beyond physical conditions to a broader understanding of individual and communal well-being. Ultimately, development practices could evolve in a new security environment. Whereas initially they avoided security issues, the end of the Cold War made it possible to see security challenges as more complex and requiring longer-term solutions in line with developmental approaches. Over time, an awareness of indirect or structural violence made it possible for donor security aims to recognize the need to prioritize the well-being of vulnerable groups, refocusing on the human security of populations and fomenting institutional and normative structures for positive peace in order to prevent destabilization in the long-term.⁶

Alternatively, SSR can be viewed as the outcome of a historical process of collaboration of the original civil-military relations paradigm with the development sector, that occurs in such a way that it results in broad generalizations of the concept of SSR, making it difficult to apply to particular cases and limiting the ability to cooperatively engage the security sector in the process

⁵ Michael Brzoska, "The Concept of Security Sector Reform", in Herbert Wulf ed. *Security Sector Reform*. Bonn International Center for Conversion. Brief 15. Bonn, 2000, p.

⁶ Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. *A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform*, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007.

of reform.⁷ Civil-military relations risk placing civilian authority and the military in a zero-sum game relation where only one can succeed and its success is its dominance over the other.⁸ Moreover, it allows for the simplification wherein civilian rule is, in contrast to the invariable authoritarianism of military rule, assumed to be democratic. The potential for biasing the understanding of SSR is evident in two forms: that military interference or dominance over politics need not be explained, but those cases in which the military does not interfere do warrant an explanation⁹; and, in the often underlying idealism that opines eliminating militaries would result in the cessation of war, rather than seeing the military as something that develops in response to war.¹⁰

The detrimental bias of development studies finds its practical manifestation in policies that see all military expenditure as a form of waste, following from the wholesale disassociation of the security sector from any potential positive contribution to development. What began as efforts to channel military resources into development projects, ended as an adversarial relationship between development aims and the function of the military.¹¹ The conjunction of these two historical trajectories may result in an SSR paradigm that overlooks the critical issue of what the security sector is actually supposed to do. Successful reform must take as its guideline the purpose of the security sector, rather than its subjugation and elimination. The CMR approach risks reducing the security sector to the status of a threat in need of minimization, and the development approach risks understanding SSR as merely a loss of resources.¹² An adequate management of these risks must begin with the admission that the security sector has a function, for society and social order, as well as for democratic governance and development. It is now recognized by the UN that without sustained stability provided by security, economic and social development is impossible.¹³

B. Definitions of SSR-

⁷ David Chuter "Understanding Security Sector Reform", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol.4, No.2, April 2006, pp. 3-5.

⁸ Chuter, p. 4.

⁹ Chuter, p. 4.

¹⁰ Chuter, p. 17.

¹¹ Chuter, p. 5.

¹² Chuter, p. 6.

¹³ Brzoska, p. 7.

SSR as an aim of development has become increasingly popularized following its articulation by the UK Minister for International Development in 1998. Her formulation of SSR entailed components: reduction of military expenses for developing states accompanied by redirection of those resources towards development; development programs with a security dimension; donor commitment to conflict prevention and resolution; and, more efficient governance over security-providing institutions.¹⁴ The UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) defines SSR as: “a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognized democratic norms and principles.”¹⁵

The DFID defines SSR as resulting in security provision consistent with democratic governance, such that security forces are accountable, reduce the risk of conflict, and create a condition enabling sustainable development.¹⁶ This functional definition of SSR centers on the output in terms of an improvement for states in “accountability and transparency of their security sectors.”¹⁷ The OECD definition is grounded on the development of democratic norms in conjunction with good governance resulting in the ‘well-functioning’ of the security sector.¹⁸ The OECD DAC stipulates SSR as: “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence, and policing.”¹⁹ The U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, and Agency for International Development have an agreed upon definition of SSR: “the set of policies, plans, programs and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall

¹⁴ See Michael Brzoska. 2003. *Security sector reform in development donor perspective: origins, theory and practice*. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Occasional Paper 4. Geneva.

¹⁵ Department of International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004.

¹⁶ Department for International Development. 2003. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. *A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict*. London.

¹⁷ DFID Terms of Reference for the Provision of Consultancy Services on Conflict, Security and Development Issues, ref 01/2892, undated, para. 8.

¹⁸ OECD. 2004. *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, A DAC Reference Document. Paris: OECD, p. 16. Note that The OECD Guidelines for Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, of the Development Assistance Committee includes child soldiers as an area of SSR focus.

¹⁹ OECD, 2004.

objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.”²⁰

The Stability Pact for Southern Europe defines SSR as a “right-sizing, reorientation, and reform, and capacity-building of national defense forces.”²¹ The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) understands SSR as the process “to create armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, professional forces under objective and subjective political control, at the lowest functional level of resource use.”²² Some definitions link SSR to disarmament. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo conceives of SSR in terms of the successful reduction of small arms.²³

Both security sector governance and the rule of law are understood as indispensable components of security reform. SSG involves oversight and management of the security sector that is transparent, accountable, and legitimate. Rule of law is the practice of the “principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law.”²⁴

C. Dimensions of SSR-

There are four related elements of SSR: political, economic, social, and institutional. First, the political element entails the creation of civilian authority over the military, police, and intelligence sectors. Second, the economic element involves balancing the over-consumption of resources with the underfunding of the security apparatus. Third, the social element focuses on practicing the ideal of human security or people-centered order. Fourth, the institutional element is supported by a division of labor between the different security actors, and excluding the military from a role in domestic politics.²⁵

²⁰ “Security Sector Reform” U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and Department of State, February 2009, p. 3.

²¹ Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table III, Security and Defense Issues, “Security Sector Reform”, paper for the Regional Conference, Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001.

²² Michael Brzoska, “The Concept of Security Sector Reform” in *Security Sector Reform*, BICC Briefing Paper No. 15, Bonn, 2000, p. 9.

²³ See www.prio.no/research/project.asp. See also: Dominick Donald and Funmi Oloisakin, “Security Sector Reform and the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Ploughshares Briefing 01.7.

²⁴ “Security Sector Reform” U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and Department of State, February 2009, p. 4.

²⁵ Wulf, 2004, p. 5.

The United Nations Security Council understands SSR to involve various areas of governance such as strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, civilian oversight, and good governance standards.²⁶ Although no absolute agreement on what SSR entails, a fairly comprehensive list of components includes: building the capacity of security sector institutions so that they can effectively carry out legitimate functions; augmenting civilian oversight and control; building adherence to the norms of human rights and rule of law for security sector actors; augmenting oversight by civil society organizations; maintaining transparency for security budgeting and spending; increasing regional confidence-building and collaboration; assisting or enacting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; reducing the availability of small arms; including security sector reform as part of the political discourse of elected and non-elected officials.²⁷

These components can be divided into two generations.²⁸ First-generation reform is rooted in the insights and reasoning of civil-military relations. It centers on the depoliticizing of the security sector actors and fomenting democratic civilian control. It entails the transparent division of labor between security sector actors and procedures and norms for democratic control based on a transparent and accepted chain of command. Moreover, there must be a clear and consistent demarcation of the various levels and parts of government institutions contributing to the provision of security. This should be based on legislation such as constitutional standards which also include clear limitations on the powers of the different security sector institutions.

A key aspect of first-generation SSR is the establishment of oversight and transparency. This occurs by granting the parliament or legislative branch the constitutionally declared capacity for decision-making power over the security budget along with committees to investigate and monitor the practices of security sector actors. This is correlate to the overall re-articulation of the civilian-military relationship and the depoliticization of the security sector which requires removing elements from that sector that are vehemently partisan or with strong ties to any prior authoritarian regime or ideological commitment to the identity cleavages contributing to conflict. First-generation SSR should begin the process of professionalizing the security sector following a

²⁶ UNSC Resolution, 20 February 2007.

²⁷ Chuter, p. 6.

²⁸ Timothy Edmunds "Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation", Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Working Paper no. 86, October 2002, pp. 7-11.

detailed assessment of actual security needs and the tasks of the component elements of the security sector.²⁹

Second-generation SSR refers to the combination of emphases on strengthening democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight, making transparency of security funding transparent, improving the efficiency of policy implementation and effectiveness of the provision of security for all, and increasing the contribution of interaction with civil society. It is important to generate civilian management with the knowledge and capacity related to security sector needs, aims, and processes. Without this, there is little possibility of effective management and it becomes unlikely that security sector actors will submit to civilian authorities. The bureaucratic levels and institutions of the security sector should have the capacity to implement policy, and to contribute to the oversight of other sectors to foster transparency. Weaknesses in capacity include an absence of information about the resources delegated to and used by the security sector, weak analysis of policy options, poor strategies linking goals and resources, and bureaucracies that are unable or unwilling to implement policies.³⁰

The security community is composed of the actors relevant to SSR. It has four parts³¹: core institutions of military, police, and intelligence services; managing bodies such as legislatures, executives, and ministries; non-core institutions including the judiciary and correctional services; and, non-statutory institutions such as insurgent organizations, militias, political party armed wings, and private security companies.³² Oversight bodies include both the executive and legislative, security sector actors may be considered to include both law enforcement and the judiciary, and non-state actors must be addressed in their capacity as effective security providers.³³ The U.S. conception articulates a different set of four related groups: state security providers, government management and oversight bodies, civil society, and non-state providers of justice and security.³⁴ Note that this categorization has the added value of recognizing the importance of civil

²⁹ Edmunds, p. 8.

³⁰ Edmunds, pp. 9-10.

³¹ OECD. 2004. *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, A DAC Reference Document. Paris: OECD, pp. 16-17.

³² Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, "Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector", Bonn International Center for Conversion. Paper 21. Bonn, 2002, p. 8.

³³ Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. *A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform*, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007.

³⁴ "Security Sector Reform" U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and Department of State, February 2009, pp. 3-4.

society in overall democratization and ensuring that SSR goes beyond simple CMR in contributing to achieving development and human security. Another approach defines the security sector as including traditional security actors including both armed forces and police, oversight bodies including both the executive and legislative branches of the state, civil society organizations, judiciary and law enforcement institutions including prisons, and non-state security providers.³⁵

Empirical studies on SSR have generated a significantly increased understanding of the aspects of reform: reasons for reform, types of reform, and potential for reform in conflict situations based on the specifics of the case. The following reasons are now generally recognized as motives for reform: budget demands that apply to all cases, post-conflict peace-building, ongoing conflict requiring stronger security services, transitioning away from military rule, transitioning away from authoritarianism, transitioning away from single-party rule, enabling participation in international peacekeeping efforts, and, membership in military alliances or regional organizations.³⁶ One or more of these reasons account for domestic commitment to reform, but also indicate why domestic intentions and ownership may be limited. Successful SSR fundamentally depends on the existence of democratic institutions and the internalization of democratic norms. Empirically observed cases of success often involve a committed executive supported by external donors.³⁷ Nevertheless, strengthening the executive also runs the risk of personifying power and enabling a monopolization of authority that runs counter to democratic standards.

There are eight types of SSR. These are: collaboration between security services and civilian institutions to foster democratization; democratization and growth of civil society with only minimal SSR; top-down reform without public involvement; reform rhetoric without significant change; donor-driven reform without local initiative or acceptance; restructuring of the security sector in accordance externally derived standards; inclusion of parties in generating a post-conflict environment; and, constructing wholly new security institutions at the behest of external pressure and utilizing external assistance.³⁸

³⁵ Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. *A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform*. International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007, p. 1.

³⁶ Wulf 2004, p. 8.

³⁷ Wulf, p. 9.

³⁸ Wulf, p. 8.

Successful SSR must occur in the context of broader efforts to address and remedy modes of structural violence. These operate as underlying obstacles to reform which ensure achievements will be limited, reversible, and perhaps even counterproductive. Structural violence exists as persistent authoritarianism, weak and ineffective governance, poverty and exclusion, and discrimination of minorities (ethnic and religious prejudices).³⁹ Efforts that only seek to remedy violence will falter without a broader commitment to the prevention of conflict through addressing its structural causes. This is correlated to recognizing the importance of local ownership and case-specific needs of the host nation population, which is in part based on developing SSR programs as a component of longer-term objectives.⁴⁰

It is also important the reform of the security sector be supported by a long-term commitment and in collaboration with the right domestic partners. Strategies for security reform must acknowledge the fact that external involvement will most likely blur the line between aid and intervention⁴¹ due to the targeting of aid and recommendations. Moreover, without internal intentions of domestic actors, it may be more useful to restrict modes of cooperation and offers of assistance as resources can be co-opted for practices that are detrimental to the ‘human’ security of the populace. In overcoming entrenched authoritarianism and protracted civil conflict, security reform can only progress with the support of national and local leadership. Cultivating this support, moreover, will only occur by way of confidence-building practices that generate legitimacy and trust between the core security actors and civilian leadership and population.⁴² One must also keep in mind that, threats to human security may come from the military as it despotically seeks to dominate over political decision-making, but military control may also be a response to despotism and corruption of civilian political rulers.⁴³

Donor policy related to SSR suffers from three primary weaknesses. Lack of coordination among policies of donor states, lack of coordination among agencies and ministries of individual donor states, and most detrimentally, the separation of defense relations which are often

³⁹ Lauri Nathan, 2001, p.

⁴⁰ “Security Sector Reform” U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and Department of State, February 2009, p. 5.

⁴¹ Some analysts take the position that any donor supported or directed efforts for SSR are a mode of intervention. See Wulf, p. 13.

⁴² Ball and Brzoska, 2002.

⁴³ Wulf, p. 15.

characterized by arms trade from efforts for development and SSR.⁴⁴ Development ministries push for the reduction of arms expenditures while economics and trade ministries seek out arms sales. Policy coordination to achieve debt relief is cancelled out by arms imports which add to national debt. These problems are compounded by an overall selectivity of interventions and aid by the international community.⁴⁵

Resource allocation for the security sector should aim to minimize the amount of resources deviated from development purposes, recognize that order and stability are themselves prerequisites for development, and admit that this recognition alone is not sufficient to develop a targeted policy blueprint for prioritizing the distribution of limited resources.⁴⁶

SSR literature demonstrates a universal consensus that one primary aim of reform is civilian rule. Thus, the first and most obvious challenge is limiting the political role of the military. This is, however, predicated on discipline and professionalization of the armed forces. A professional military is subject to civilian control but is also itself protected from politicians who seek to turn it into a tool for personal ends or party loyalty. Civilian decision-makers must be inculcated with a certain minimum of human resources to be capable of managing the military even without being of a military background themselves.⁴⁷ To do so they must be made aware of the needs, interests, limitations, and priorities of security sector institutions.

Civilian leadership must have the technical and resource capacities to control the security services, as well as the foresight to decline opportunities to co-opt them for the purposes of concentrating power and reinvigorating authoritarian rule. This means that support and training aid must include a focus on building the capacities of the legislative and executive branches and civil society, as well as aiming for legislative control over the executive and the strengthening of the sector of civil society organizations. Reform is potentially more rapid in post-conflict conditions, as situations of political stability involve governments that are slow to make transformations. It follows that successful reform efforts are not wholly contingent upon a specific type of regime and that democratization does not by itself guarantee security reforms.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Wulf, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁵ Wulf, p. 16.

⁴⁶ Wulf, p. 14.

⁴⁷ Wulf, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Wulf, p. 17.

Significant domestic obstacles often exist which pressure maintaining the status quo. As a result, reform efforts often focus on improving the capacity of the armed forces and cutting costs rather than increasing the security of the population. Moreover, the transparency necessary for SSR directly challenges the capacities of the intelligence institutions in their function as ‘secret’ services. This makes it necessary that intelligence services are subjected to rigorous civilian oversight.⁴⁹ Four primary challenges in implementing SSR are: achieving genuine local ownership in conditions where security forces are part of the problem; the financial and human resource cost for the reforming states; the diversity of activities entailed in successful reform which leads to inconsistencies in programming and reform efforts; and the long-term commitment from donors seeking maximum outcome gains in the short-term.⁵⁰

Several key principles must be adhered to ensure best practices in reform programming. As agreed to by the OECD, the most important of these are: building understanding and political will at the local level by ensuring the progressive development of effective governance and accountability; increasing cooperation between security bodies and non-security institutions; recognizing that reform is long-term through the necessary commitment; and integrating different types of government authority instead rather than carrying out disjointed efforts.⁵¹

II. SSR and Peacebuilding

A. General Considerations-

“The underlying structural causes of inter- and especially intra-state crises cannot be resolved through quick fixes. Security sector reform does not end with the cessation of the most obvious gross violence and warfare. It is a medium-range reform program, which has to be embedded in a long-term process of peace-building.”⁵²

In conflict situations lacking developed political and administrative bodies, the conflict can be exacerbated by conditioned aid which, albeit with the best intentions, is poorly designed for the

⁴⁹ Wulf, pp. 7-8.

⁵⁰ Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. *A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform*, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007.

⁵¹ OECD DAC Handbook, pp. 10-12.

⁵² Wulf, p. 18.

practical situation on the ground. When the ideals and commitment of civilian rulers and military officials are in question, donors would do better to focus on strengthening civil society.⁵³ The dilemma for SSR efforts in a post-conflict situation centers on finding the right balance between the size, resources, and influence of the security sector. On the one hand, post-conflict situations are characterized by an excess in the size of the armed forces such that they are larger than what is “politically desirable and economically sustainable.” On the other hand, the prevalence of internal security problems in post-conflict conditions demands a build-up and strengthening of relevant security institutions.⁵⁴

The potential for SSR in cases of conflict is dependent upon the conditions of the specific state. These conditions vary from ongoing war to post-conflict communities. Between these two poles there are cases capable of varying degrees of reform, each evidencing their own types of obstacles. In cases of war and ongoing civil conflict, disarmament and demobilization are extremely difficult. SSR efforts in such cases should focus on building civil society and increasing its capacity to normalize peace and the practice of accountability for security forces. In countries characterized as areas of conflict, SSR efforts should seek to counter the tendency towards armament by building practices in civil society to increase human security. In failed states where there is a loss of monopoly over the use of force, such a monopoly may have to be rebuilt in order to initiate a process of security reform. More potential exists in states involved in a process of conflict mediation, but to harness this potential trust and confidence-building are necessary. The limits to reform in post-authoritarian states can be surpassed by eroding persistent authoritarianism and nepotism as well as criminal activities carried out by the police. In states that are transitioning from conflict to peace, there is a need to overcome the resistance of the security sector to change due to the threat of a loss of power and privilege by security institutions. In post-conflict situations, SSR can build on the optimism and enthusiasm for progressive change that follow peace agreements.⁵⁵

The evolution of emphasis on SSR correlates with the progressive acceptance of the concept of human security in development and the transformation of peacekeeping into peacebuilding at the United Nations. The concept of peacebuilding was first set out by SG

⁵³ Wulf, p. 16.

⁵⁴ Brzoska, p. 7.

⁵⁵ Wulf, pp. 6-7.

Boutros-Ghali as he defined post-conflict reconstruction as the task of building structures to avoid relapse into conflict.⁵⁶ It was furthered by SG Kofi Annan who emphasized the need to address the underlying structural factors which induce conflict and create conditions for both reconciliation and reconstruction.⁵⁷

Post-conflict recovery demands coordination among the top levels of different relevant actors including concordance on normative, administrative, and strategic aims. The sustainability of reforms is predicated on involving local partners and ultimately transitioning to full local ownership. Post-conflict peace-building includes revitalizing political, economic, and security institutions which can only be done in secure conditions, and such conditions require external military forces. External military forces must be an integral part of the overall transformation process. Conflict resolution based on positive and sustainable peace includes SSR which must meet the demands placed on a 'post-modern' military. These demands include a general historical tendency of decreasing influence of traditional values of honor and nationalism and increasing influence of universal values of rights and democracy; a rise in non-traditional security threats and correlate increase in military tasks other than war; increased acceptance and pressure for international intervention into conflict situations; internationalization of military forces through into regional security forces; changes in the practice of war following increase in counterinsurgency and changes in technology; and, privatization of conflict through involvement of non-state actors and privately funded forces.⁵⁸

B. The importance of DDR and Transitional Justice-

Following the increased international concern with post-conflict peacebuilding, there has been a significant development in terms of institutional arrangements and efforts as well as research and funding aimed at conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation to prevent relapse. DDR is an important first step for all of these processes. The UNSC has recognized the link between SSR and other processes needed for both stabilization and reconstruction, including

⁵⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, A/47/277-S/24111. New York: United Nations, para. 21.

⁵⁷ United Nations. 1998. *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/52/871-S/1998/318. New York: United Nations, para. 63.

⁵⁸ Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 4.

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Its conception of DDR extends to include repatriation, rehabilitation, and small arms control.⁵⁹

In the context of generalized contemporary conditions, SSR must focus on delimiting the role of the military so as to restrict it from politics and establish civilian rule. Problematically, at the same time, national militaries must evolve beyond the traditional tasks of external defense and responding to aggression. Specific post-conflict societies can be characterized as sharing several traits: dependency on aid, confronting organized violence and persistent insecurity, weak state structures, and little strategic value for advanced economies and/or consolidated democratic states.⁶⁰

Post-conflict situations entail military forces and armed groups that must be reintegrated into the society. Moreover, political institutions must be restored and endowed with capacities. Civilian control over the military is needed, and this depends on an overall increase in trust and confidence building between civil society and the state, and between civilian leaders and military elites. Military involvement of foreign forces must be augmented while simultaneously demobilizing national-level military actors and restricting the parameters of their activities.⁶¹

Schnabel and Ehrhart denote several requirements for establishing SSR as a component of peace-building. The delimitation of the military's involvement in domestic politics must be followed with a clear and consistent mechanism of accountability for military spending and actions. The separation of the police and military must correlate making the police serve the populace including self-censoring its capacities to violate human rights. Corruption of the judicial system must be minimized and appointments of judges should be based on experience and capacity rather than political affiliation or personal loyalty to power-holders. Strengthening of civilian management depends on effective oversight by parliamentary institutions to bring together bipartisanship, financial transparency, and democratic accountability. Budget transparency demands regular periodic statements making public information and allowing for accounting and auditing of military resource consumption.⁶²

⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution, 20 February 2007.

⁶⁰ Dylan Hendrickson, "A Review of Security Sector Reform" The Conflict, Security and Development Group, Working Paper no. 1, London, 1999, p. 7.

⁶¹ Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 5.

⁶² Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 7-8.

Increasing respect for human rights by security forces and adherence to the rule of law will generate trust in the security sector actors and enable the legitimization of their monopoly over the use of force. Public trust as well as institutional transparency require an active civil society that can promulgate democratic norms and continue monitoring military and police forces after the withdrawal of foreign armies or aid. Civil society should be included in regional forums and dialogues in conjunction with an overall emphasis on regional integration and cooperation. Specifically focusing on core security actors, the most immediate and urgent aim of conflict resolution involves SSR in the form of demobilization and reintegration of military personnel and limiting the proliferation of weapons, especially small arms.⁶³

DDR can only be successful if it is approached as one element of a larger agenda supporting SSR, transitional justice, good governance and the rule of law, and development.⁶⁴ Transitional justice has been a major element in societal reconciliation and redress of grave violations of human rights, at least since the 1980s. Both DDR and transitional justice seek sustainable conflict resolution involving positive peace based on trust and reconciliation that precludes the renewal of violence.⁶⁵

Four key elements to transitional justice are compatible with DDR: prosecution, illumination of truth, reparations for victims of human rights violations, and reform of institutions. First, prosecutions aim to erase the persistent impunity for combatants that occurs in conflict conditions. This is a first step to grounding the rule of law in post-conflict cases and separates combatants who seek to undermine reconciliation from those who support it by isolating those who resist DDR. Second, if combatants are not included in the processes of establishing accountability and finding the truth, they may resist those processes and it makes it increasingly likely that they will not be successfully reintegrated into society. Third, reparations for rights violations and other injustices support reintegration by reducing the feelings of animosity and desire for vengeance experienced by individuals and communities in post-conflict situations. Fourth, institutional reform supports the development of a security sector following conflict which does not include former combatants who were involved in or ideologically supportive of atrocities.

⁶³ Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 9.

⁶⁴ Ana Cutter Patel "Transitional Justice, DDR and Security Sector Reform", International Center for Transitional Justice Research Brief, February 2010, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Cutter Patel, pp. 1-2.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration set out a foundation for security sector reform in post-conflict conditions. Both aim for improvements in the security situation and for alterations of the actors involved in providing security. Both DDR and SSR programs now accept the concept of human security or security that is focused on the well-being of the people rather than on the military capacity of the state. Without coordinating DDR in the overall SSR framework, violators of human rights can be included in the reformed security sector.⁶⁶

Transitional justice initiatives and efforts at SSR aim to reform violent elements in the security sector and to create security sector actors that respect human rights and value an end to impunity. Prosecutions of rights violators foment the rule of law and deter repetitions of violations. By removing violators from the security services obstacles to reform can be overcome. Moreover, transitional justice practices establish trust and confidence in the community and among warring factions that support the legitimacy of the security sector institutions, as well as increasing accountability which is a primary aim of SSR efforts. Transitional justice initiates the oversight and vetting practices that are integral to the reform of the security sector. Transitional justice practices also improve the empowerment of the citizenry which supports civilian control and democratic accountability of the security sector.⁶⁷

C. Local Ownership and Elites-

Although the ultimate end of SSR is democratic control and good governance, the process often begins with external donors and their commitment to mainstream reform into political dialogue and modes of cooperation. Donor aid should be made dependent on the achievements of practical and significant security reforms, and until that is achieved external assistance should be restricted to non-security sectors along with strong accounting and auditing practices in place. External actors must initiate the reform process through concerted commitment in post-conflict scenarios, and ensure that local actors are sufficiently endowed with the capacities to carry on the process. The greatest challenge to SSR is two-fold: it is inhibited by domestic elites who do not value accountability or transparency, and it is limited by external actors who are reluctant to commit the time and resources necessary for successful reform.⁶⁸ Multiple studies have come to

⁶⁶ Cutter Patel, p. 3.

⁶⁷ Cutter Patel, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸ Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 11.

highlight the importance of domestic level actors, especially the national elites.⁶⁹ In post-conflict situations, although the recipients of assistance, these national-level actors are suspicious of conditions put on aid and view the efforts of external actors as forcing policy preferences on that state.⁷⁰

Accordingly, SSR projects should focus more on cultivating cooperation between donors and local stakeholders. The component of SSR derived from the contribution or cooperation of internal actors requires strong national-level leadership capable of fomenting consensus and executing concrete steps to adjust legislation and budget policy, as well as manage ‘spoiler’ interest groups that seek to block reforms or even reinstate hostilities.⁷¹ Moreover, once the limitations of donor-driven reform are recognized in the absence of broad-based societal support and consensus among key internal actors, strong leadership can function as the catalyst for generating the conditions for reform at the domestic level. Lessons learned from empirical studies on SSR demonstrate that, without such supportive leadership, reform efforts must turn to civil society and seek to generate inertia for reform among the public and other officials.⁷²

Post-conflict SSR must first address significant social chasms, which primarily form along the lines of ethnic identity but can also be just as divisive when formed in terms of political parties. Reconciliation between the different camps requires generating a minimum of trust between groups by focusing on shared interests and common aims.⁷³ National reconciliation manifesting as national identity is a precondition for even negotiating the relationship between civilian political authorities and the military hierarchy.⁷⁴ However, moving beyond the groundwork of the reconciliation that characterizes negative peace in a post-conflict situation, requires recognizing that national elites, while having the potential to greatly further SSR, tend to be the primary obstacles to significant reform.

⁶⁹ This awareness correlates with the recognition of the limits of externally driven reform. See Hendrickson, p. 7.

⁷⁰ Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka “Security sector reform and donor policies” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 19 ff.

⁷¹ Stefan Wolff “The politics of fear versus the politics of intimidation: Security sector reform in Northern Ireland” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 183 ff.

⁷² David Darchiashvili “Civil-military relations and security sector reform in a newly independent transitional state: The Georgian case” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 156-160.

⁷³ Biljana Vankovska “Ethnic-military relations in Macedonia” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 93-96.

⁷⁴ Nivaldo H. Galleguillos “Civil-military relations and national reconciliation in Chile in the aftermath of the Pinochet affair” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 243-245.

Scholars recognize that national-level political elites have prevented the consolidation of democratic governance in some cases⁷⁵, that the support of such elites is needed for reforms, and that such support can be cultivated by generating an “intersectoral consensus” on the general aims and strategies for developing democratic accountability. Moreover, elites can be economic elites, political elites, or military elites. The situation of elites is transforming as they become increasingly linked to elites in other states through ties of economic globalization.⁷⁶

Elites often maintain colonial strategies of rule in post-colonial conditions, and following conflicts often utilize the military and police to create authoritarian systems by repressing opposition groups or parties.⁷⁷ Empirical studies of SSR have shown that elites can weaken bureaucracies in order to consolidate power and use centralized authority to wield security forces against opposition.⁷⁸ Deterioration of the security forces may also come from intentionally fragmenting them, resulting in poorly coordinated components, as an intentional strategy to hold on to power when the allegiance of those forces to the leadership is undermined.⁷⁹ On the other hand, in post-conflict situations, the lack of a functioning bureaucracy, economic instability, and absence of legitimacy due to low public trust and social capital may pressure even reluctant elites into greater and greater reliance on security forces to maintain order and implement policy.⁸⁰ Two specific difficulties related to military elites arise when it comes to technical and financial assistance for SSR provided to the core actors. The first is that it is challenging to assess the sincerity of their rhetoric for reform. The second is that the resources received will be utilized to redraw the relationship between military elites and civilian authorities, empowering the former over the latter.⁸¹

D. Role of Parliaments-

⁷⁵ Galleguillos, p. 239 ff.

⁷⁶ Hendrickson, p. 11.

⁷⁷ Hendrickson, p. 21.

⁷⁸ William Reno “War, Markets and the Reconfiguration West Africa’s Weak States,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29 (4), 1997.

⁷⁹ Alex de Waal “Contemporary Warfare in Africa: Changing Context, Changing Strategies”, Institute for Development Studies Bulletin, Vol. 27(3) , (Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute for Development Studies, 1996).

⁸⁰ Hendrickson, p. 23.

⁸¹ Chris Smith “Preparing Security Forces for Their Role in Civil Society”, *Brassey’s Defence Yearbook*, (London: Brassey’s, 1999).

Given that democratic control of the security sector is one of the most primary aims of SSR, the most apparent role of parliaments is to provide effective and legitimate oversight for security institutions and monitor both their financing and activities. Parliaments can work to ensure that military officials are held accountable, socialized with norms of good governance, and emphasize political neutrality among the corps. Importantly, “A democratic system of civilian oversight can vary in its design but serves the critical function of ensuring that the security sector is held accountable to the needs and priorities of the public.”⁸²

Democratic government is predicated in part on control of the security sector by democratically elected authorities. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector in new democracies is linked to three aims. First, states in post-conflict conditions involved in generating political stability face an immediate demand for increased capacity of security institutions. Second, without democratic accountability, the security sector can evolve into the ruling institutions of the state. In such conditions, the security sector maintains influence and control of the political process, disregards the rule of law and exercises authority with impunity by engaging in potentially systematic abuses of human rights, and becomes the tool of authorities for the personal or partisan monopolization of power and pursuit of self-interest. Third, the rule of law requires equal treatment under the law, disallowing exemptions for military figures or privileged treatment for actors involved in law enforcement.⁸³ Security sector actors as well as the executive branch must be held accountable and the legislature can significantly contribute to doing so.

The problems stemming from the security sector in transitional political systems are rooted in the political and economic influence of the security sector which enables it to pressure or even dominate politics. In such conditions, the security sector institutions can be manipulated by politicization to serve partisan or personal interests. Where civilian politicians abuse their authority over the security sector it becomes increasingly likely that the security institutions will themselves become abusive. The security sector in transitional states is supported by an inflated budget which is itself not subject to transparent oversight and so lends itself to mismanagement. There is generally poor management and budgeting and high levels of corruption and waste, as well as, low human resource development among security officials and the civilians tasked with

⁸² Craig Kowalik “Parliaments and Security Sector Oversight: An Emerging Area for Capacity Development”, Parliamentary Centre, Ottawa, 2006.

⁸³ *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector*. European Union, Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy. Brussels, 2013, p. 44.

oversight functions.⁸⁴ The ‘Security Deficit’ refers to a security sector that either does not effectively provide for security or is itself a source of insecurity by contributing to violence and conflict. However, authoritarian states often have effective security systems for the protection and preservation of the regime, but without civilian control and democratic accountability the security sector suffers from a ‘Governance Deficit’.⁸⁵ If efforts are made including training and financing of the security sector to remedy the Security Deficit without also addressing the Governance Deficit, then the risk increases that the security sector will assert control over politics or be used by politicians for partisan or personal aims.⁸⁶

In post-conflict conditions, the role of the parliament is to prevent internal factionalism and build public trust in the institutions of the state. In a general sense, the relation of authority between the military and parliament must be redefined.⁸⁷ Moreover, the parliament must work toward the proliferation of the norms of good governance and democratic accountability. The parliament must debate and negotiate the proper balance between transparency and secrecy of national security. Parliament must strive to achieve an integrated and coordinated policy-producing system among the different ministries, departments, and organizations of the state. All elements of SSR for core security actors should be mirrored with corresponding training and capacity-building of parliamentarians.⁸⁸

There are many other ways that parliaments can support SSR. Parliaments should exercise their authority to debate and enact legislation supporting security reforms. Related to such debate that should seek to publicize and popularize relevant norms. In some cases, parliaments have the power to choose the head of military forces. In all cases, parliaments should work closely with the executive to ensure that human security is a guiding principle of military activities. Concerning the executive, the parliament must act as an effective balance to ensure that monopolization of power does not occur and enable abuse. One aspect of doing this is to practice parliamentary supervision over the budget for the security forces. Another way to do this is to hold the executive accountable for policy problems with the security sector.

⁸⁴ EU, p. 48.

⁸⁵ EU, pp. 49-50.

⁸⁶ EU, p. 50.

⁸⁷ Hendrickson, p. 30.

⁸⁸ Kowalik, op cit.

The parliaments of donors providing resources for SSR and development should work to provide capacity-building support to the parliament in the recipient state.⁸⁹ Donors should stress technical assistance in the area of ability to effectively conduct parliamentary oversight. Both recipient and donor parliaments should cultivate a sense of duty among officials for the support of SSR aims. Donor and recipient parliaments should cooperate to build a learning network of parliamentarians for sharing information and knowledge, and fostering intergovernmental ties which will strengthen the sense of security of the post-conflict state.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Hendrickson, p. 10.

⁹⁰ Kowalik, op cit.